


TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 5 Feb 82
TO: SA/NPI		
ROOM NO. 7E47	BUILDING HQS	
REMARKS: <div style="text-align: center;">  <i>Tarkenton</i> <i>AK</i> <i>MS-</i> <i>Mr. 2nd H. Rose to</i> <i>provide FYE advice 2-</i> <i>rec. sh. ff.</i> </div>		
FROM: D/OGI		
ROOM NO. 3G00	BUILDING HQS	



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

4 FEB 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Addressee List)


FROM :
Director of Global Issues

25X1

SUBJECT : USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards
Reporting on India

The attached memorandum concerning Soviet implementation of IAEA safeguards procedures in India was prepared to focus attention on yet another way the credibility of the regime can be undermined. ?

25X1



Attachments:

1. USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards Reporting on India, GI M 82-10041, February 1982
2. Addressees List

~~SECRET~~

25X1

**SUBJECT: USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards
Reporting on India**

Addressees List:

**Michael Guhin
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building**

**Eugene V. Rostow
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency**

**Richard Kennedy
Under Secretary for Management
Department of State**

**Dr. Paul Wolfowitz
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Department of State**

**James L. Malone
Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs
Department of State**

**Richard Burt
Director
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State**

**The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
Deputy Secretary of Defense**

**Fred C. Ikle
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

**John Labarre
Senior Intelligence Officer
Department of Energy**

**Harold Bengelsdorf
Office of International Affairs
Department of Energy**

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**SUBJECT: USSR/IAEA - Problems with Nuclear Safeguards
Reporting on India**

OGI/IID/WP **(2 Feb 82)**

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Distribution: (Attachment with each copy)

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

5 February 1981

USSR/IAEA - PROBLEMS WITH NUCLEAR
SAFEGUARDS REPORTING ON INDIA

SUMMARY

IAEA Soviet inspectors have caused--through ineptitude--a serious mistake to occur regarding safeguards inspections in India

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Mechanical and procedural errors in implementing safeguards at the Indian PREFRE reprocessing plant prevent effective IAEA coverage of stored spent reactor fuel.

In February 1981, Soviet inspectors improperly positioned two surveillance cameras in the spent fuel storage pond. It was

This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] Weapons Proliferation Branch, International Issues Division, Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Office of Near East and South Asia, the Office of Soviet Analysis, the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research of the DDI, and the Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. This analysis is based on information available as of 4 February 1982.

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Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed

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Chief. Weapons Proliferation Branch

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not until after a ten month delay in processing the film that it was learned the glare on the pond's surface from overhead spot-lights made the photographs useless. In addition, the Soviet inspectors inadequately monitored the spent fuel transfers from containers shipped from the power reactor (RAPP I) to PREFRE. Soviet inspectors were present only for the removal of IAEA seals from the shipping casks at the beginning of the transfer but did not stay for the entire three-to-four days it takes to complete the operation. As a result of those procedures the IAEA is unable to properly account for spent fuel awaiting reprocessing at PREFRE.

There is no evidence of Indian involvement with the Soviets in the procedures that led to the anomaly

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We doubt that a diversion has occurred. India has other sources of unsafeguarded spent fuel and would not need to take the political risks involved in violating safeguards. Moreover, India traditionally has been forthcoming in meeting its safeguards obligations. New Delhi could be expected to cooperate fully with the IAEA to rectify the problem and to remove the potential for a politically embarrassing situation.

Mistakes in implementing verification procedures by Soviet inspectors threaten to undercut the broader Soviet policy to control IAEA operations in India. This long-standing Soviet effort has been designed to keep New Delhi's safeguarded nuclear program above suspicion in order to deny Pakistan any justification for pursuing a nuclear weapons option.

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* Over the years, the Soviet Union has consolidated its role as the administrator of all IAEA safeguards in its Eastern European nuclear client states. Successful in manipulating the IAEA to attain a special role in the Bloc, Moscow appears to be taking a similar approach in India.

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